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The role of models to support recommendations on the
cost-effective use of medical technologies and pharma-
ceuticals is controversial. At the heart of the contro-
versy is the degree to which experimental or other em-
pirical evidence should be required prior to model use.
The controversy stems in part from a misconception
that the role of models is to establish truth rather than
to guide clinical and policy decisions. In other domains
of public policy that involve human life and health,
such as environmental protection and defense strategy,
models are generally accepted as decision aids, and
many models have been formally incorporated into reg-
ulatory processes and governmental decision making.
We formulate an analytical framework for evaluating
the role of models as aids to decision making. Implica-
tions for the implementation of Section 114 of the Food
and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA)
are derived from this framework.
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Introduction
 
The use of models in health-care decision making
is controversial. Resistance to models can come
from physicians who claim that clinical judgment
cannot be quantified, from empiricists who warn
that input data can be inaccurate, from epidemiol-
ogists who worry that logical assumptions about
cause and effect may be wrong, from techno-
phobes who worry about hidden bugs lurking in
black boxes, and from cynics who fear that propo-
nents of a medical practice or product can manip-
ulate models in hidden ways to mislead decision
makers. There is an element of truth in all these
concerns. Perhaps the concern is that models, by
virtue of their quantitative nature and precise-
looking computer outputs, may carry more influ-
ence than they should. For all these reasons, and
because the stakes of health-care decisions are so
great, models must be used in accordance with
reasonable public policies concerning their use.
We will argue that, although empirical tests of
model predictions against retrospective and pro-
spective data should be a part of such policies,
they should not be erected as rigid and arbitrary
barriers against the responsible use of models.
In the United States, the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) regulates information dissemi-
nated by drug companies regarding their products.
The implementation of Section 114 of the FDA
Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA) has spurred
renewed interest in creating a balance between the
flow of cost-effectiveness information to decision
makers and protection against unwarranted claims.
Other countries, in Europe and elsewhere, are also
assessing the role of models as evidence for cost-
effectiveness claims. The fundamental policy ques-
tion facing these agencies is under which condi-
tions drug manufacturers should be permitted to
use models as the basis for claims of cost-effective-
ness.
The controversy over validation of models orig-
inates in part from different perceptions of the
purpose of models. Is a model intended to predict
future events? Does it make unconditional claims
about the consequences of alternative actions? Or,
in contrast, is its purpose to aid in making better
decisions? Is its purpose to communicate, organize
data, or persuade? The way we evaluate models
should be consistent with the purpose of the model.
We would not demand that a road map display
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topographic features and might not even demand
that it be drawn accurately to scale, but the same
would not be true of an aircraft navigation map.
Likewise, models intended to help decision makers
need not pass the tests required of claims to scien-
tific truth.
Our argument starts with the premise that cost-
effectiveness models are meant to be aids to deci-
sion making. Such models should be used only af-
ter careful testing to ensure internal accuracy (in-
ternal validity), to ensure that their inputs and
outputs are consistent with available data (calibra-
tion), and to ensure that their conclusions make
sense (face validity). To the extent that different
models of the same decision come to different con-
clusions, modelers should also be expected to ex-
plain the sources of the differences (convergent va-
lidity). These prerequisites for responsible model
use are not controversial. More controversial is to
what extent prospective tests of the concordance
between model outputs and actual events in the
future (predictive validity) are required. The au-
thors argue that tests of predictive validity are
valuable but not absolutely essential. The criterion
for determining whether, and to what degree, tests
of predictive validity are required prior to model
use depends on the benefits in terms of improving
the model for decision making, and the costs of
delaying the flow of information while obtaining
the additional data.
The concept of expected value of information
(VOI) in decision theory is directly applicable to
the assessment of whether more empirical valida-
tion is justified. The VOI is the difference between
the expected consequences (utility) of a decision
guided by a particular piece of information and
the expected consequences (utility) of having to
make that decision without the information [1].
VOI is also applicable to information that can re-
duce uncertainty about parameters in a decision,
such as the efficacy of a treatment, the duration of
a treatment’s effect, or its applicability to different
patient groups. Deferring a decision until more in-
formation about those parameters is in hand is an
option, albeit at a cost of resources, delay, and
possibly errors of omission or commission in the
interim. Resources may be squandered, or patients
harmed, if the more costly or less effective treatment
option is used while awaiting definitive evidence.
This is the applicable concept for the regulation of
models under FDAMA. Would the expected value
of more information about the consequences of
intervention outweigh the cost of obtaining that
information, including the forgone health benefits
 
while awaiting the information? Methods for ap-
plying VOI analysis to a clinical decision model
have been developed and demonstrated [2].
Whether formally or informally, models are al-
ways required to extrapolate evidence through
time and space, from a study population to an in-
dividual patient, from the end of a clinical trial to
the end of a patient’s illness or life, from last year
to next year. A policy of banning the use and dis-
semination of information until perfect evidence is
available to support it would paralyze the practice
of medicine. There must exist a balance between
the costs and consequences of obtaining and wait-
ing for better data and the costs and consequences
of permitting a synthesis of the available evidence
to influence decisions.
Models are used routinely to guide, or even dic-
tate, public policy decisions in many areas that af-
fect human life and health. Environmental regula-
tion and military planning and strategy are two
areas where models have gained stature as policy
tools. Beyond these, demographic models are used
routinely in the US Bureau of the Census with im-
plications for Social Security benefits, in economic
forecasting with implications for macroeconomic
policy, in transportation planning with implica-
tions for the location and operation of traffic con-
trols and the design of roadways, and in many
other areas. As in health care, advocates and crit-
ics of models exist in each of these areas. The au-
thors have reviewed the use of models in selected
areas of environmental and military decision mak-
ing with the purpose of drawing lessons for health
care from documented experience with models in
these fields. We would not claim that just because
models are sanctioned, or even required, in other
domains of policy that these practices should be
applied to health policy. We do argue, however,
that there are compelling reasons why these uses
of models are appropriate, and that these reasons
apply in health policy albeit with important differ-
ences.
This paper is organized as follows. Following
this introduction, the term 
 
model
 
 is defined. The
authors present evidence that models are ubiqui-
tous, not only in environmental decision making,
but in medical decision making as well. In fact, we
argue that clinical trials are themselves models, re-
quiring numerous assumptions and extrapolations
in order to derive inferences and clinical implica-
tions from them. The next section describes the
use of models in two areas of environmental pol-
icy: registration of new pesticides and regulation
of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). We also briefly re-
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view some uses of models in military decision mak-
ing. Next, we cite examples of models in health care
and public health that have been influential in pub-
lic policy and in the formulation of practice guide-
lines. Then we turn to the issue of evaluation of
models and propose a taxonomy and conceptual
framework for evaluation. Finally, we return to
the implications for the implementation of Section
114 of FDAMA and appropriate public policy
concerning the use and dissemination of models to
guide health-care decisions.
 
What Is a Model?
 
We all encounter models in our daily lives: road and
subway maps are examples. Other models include
plastic or electronic architectural representations of
cities, the equations of Newtonian and quantum
mechanics, or double-helix renditions of the DNA
molecule. Two experts on groundwater modeling
commented, “. . . the word 
 
model
 
 has so many
meanings and is so overused that it is sometimes dif-
ficult to know what one is referring to. . .” [3].
Hereafter, we restrict our attention to mathemati-
cal simulation models, as opposed to physical
models or other kinds of models. The National
Research Council, in its report on the uses of mi-
crosimulation modeling for social policy, offered
this definition of a simulation model: “. . . a repli-
cable, objective sequence of computations used for
generating estimates of quantities of concern. . .”
[4]. For our purposes, we define a model as an an-
alytic methodology that accounts for events over
time and across populations based on data drawn
from primary and/or secondary sources.
Box et al. [5] distinguish between empirical and
theoretical (or mechanistic) models. An empirical
model is used to hypothesize about a situation in
which “the mechanism underlying a process is not
understood sufficiently well, or is too compli-
cated, to allow an exact model to be postulated
from theory.” In a purely empirical model, the
data speak for themselves, and there is not a com-
plete, logical story line connecting cause (inputs)
and effect (outputs). In contrast, a theoretical
model is “based directly on an appreciation of
physical or mechanistic theory governing the sys-
tem.” A single clinical trial can be thought of as
an empirical model, whereas a decision-analytic
model with empirically estimated parameters, in-
cluding some estimated from clinical trials, could
be considered as a theoretical model. Box et al.
cite statistical, data-driven models such as linear
regression as examples of empirical models, but
they favor theoretical models “whenever a basic
understanding of the system is essential to prog-
ress.” They contend that a theoretical model (with
parameters estimated from data) provides a better
basis for extrapolation than does empiricism. The
disadvantage is that, although a theoretical model
can more closely represent outcomes over a wider
span of parameter values than a purely empirical
model, extrapolation of either type of model be-
yond the range of data is never completely safe.
A clinical trial, the epitome of scientific objectiv-
ity and direct evidence, is a model. Even if the only
item of interest in a study is to learn how an inter-
vention affects a particular study population, mod-
eling is at work: the process of drawing inferences
for the closed study population may involve statis-
tical modeling of measurement error or ascertain-
ment bias, curve-fitting, and other manipulations of
data. However, clinical trials are not really about
the people in the study population. Trials are used,
at least implicitly, with the assumption (or model)
that the study population is like other people not
in the trial, and therefore the conclusions from the
trial can be applied or extrapolated to other peo-
ple. This mapping from a trial population to real-
world target populations actually involves several
modeled elements, including the following:
• Functional forms of mathematical relationships
between exposure and response (e.g., additive,
linear, logistic) are specified in order to perform
tests of hypotheses and to estimate magnitudes of
effects.
• Results from the study population are applied
to target populations elsewhere in time and
space, often by assuming similarity based on a
set of patient characteristics, and often by us-
ing statistical models with covariates.
• Surrogate end points in clinical trials are usu-
ally used in lieu of truly valued outcomes. Cho-
lesterol-lowering trials that used lipid levels
as end points are open to criticism for failing to
demonstrate the link to reduced morbidity and
mortality. Even trials that use mortality as an end
point still require models to assess the conse-
quences in terms of life expectancy gain or qual-
ity-adjusted life expectancy. A notable example is
the 4S trial of simvastatin to lower cholesterol in
persons with prior heart disease; although the
trial contained evidence of a reduction in mortal-
ity, estimates of the magnitude of the life-expect-
ancy benefit and cost-effectiveness required a
model based on external data and judgment [6].
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• Observed intervention strategies are interpo-
lated or sometimes extrapolated to optimize
dosage or the frequency of intervention in rela-
tion to individual patient characteristics. This
is especially true in the formulation of screen-
ing guidelines, for which direct observations of
the range of practiced screening frequencies
and modalities are not available within clinical
trials. Although the benefits of screening mam-
mography have been demonstrated experimen-
tally in clinical trials, the incremental benefits
of annual mammography have not.
• Economic evaluations performed alongside or
in the wake of a clinical trial require modeling,
even if the central hypothesis has been experi-
mentally verified. Extrapolation from the trial
setting to different localities (or nations) with
varying clinical practice patterns, clinical skills,
and cost drivers that may or may not coincide
with those in the trial protocol, requires the
use of models.
In all of these instances, the legitimacy of the as-
sumptions and computations required to translate
from empirical evidence to policy is a matter of judg-
ment, and of modeling. Indeed, all inference from
data requires modeling, and it is a matter of de-
gree—based on value versus cost of information—
that will determine how much data are required to
support a model that is intended to inform decisions.
 
Use of Models in Policy Decision Making
 
Environmental Models
 
We have selected two examples of modeling in en-
vironmental decision making—pesticide regula-
tion and chlorofluorocarbon regulation—to illus-
trate the use of models by the US Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and other regulatory au-
thorities responsible for the control of air, water,
solid waste, toxic substances, and nuclear waste
pollution. The decision by the EPA to permit a
new pesticide on the market and regulate its resi-
dues bears some similarities to decisions regarding
the approval and marketing of new drugs. In both
cases, the policy decision concerns a new product
with possible health risks and benefits and possi-
ble economic costs and benefits. The consequences
of the status quo—not to permit the product to be
used or promoted—could be regarded as less
risky, or at least better known. However, deci-
sions are often made, based on less-than-ironclad
evidence, to permit new pesticides on the market
despite uncertainties associated with their use.
Although we focus on the examples of pesticides
and CFCs, both of which involve a statutory risk-
benefit test by the EPA, models are used through-
out the EPA under virtually all of its statutory
authorities, even when law does not permit risk-
benefit tradeoffs. Under authority of the Clean Air
Act, for example, the EPA uses model-based esti-
mates of health risk to support decisions to allow
sources of air-pollution to operate [7], despite the
possibility—which cannot be ruled out—that the
resulting pollution may cause health risks. In such
situations, the EPA trusts models that support the
abandonment of the purportedly safer status quo.
 
Pesticides.
 
The EPA uses models in two major as-
pects of regulation of pesticides: registration and
the establishment of tolerances. The details regarding
regulation of pesticides may change under the re-
cently enacted Food Quality Protection Act. We de-
scribe the process as it has evolved under existing
laws, with the expectation that the role of models
will not materially change under the new law.
For every intended use of a pesticide (i.e., the ap-
plication of a pesticide on a particular crop), the
pesticide manufacturer must register with the EPA.
The EPA does not require proof of safety of the pes-
ticide prior to registration. Rather, the EPA is au-
thorized to use models to assess human health risks
and arrive at a judgment as to whether the benefits
of use outweigh these risks. Data to support these
models may consist of up to 70 kinds of labora-
tory and field tests, at a cost of up to $10 million
over a period of 6 to 9 years, for each intended
use. If pesticides are used on food crops, then the
EPA must also establish residue tolerance for each
particular use. Tolerances are legal limits on the
amount of pesticide residues that may be present
on crops sold in commerce. They are proposed by
the manufacturer and are required to be high
enough to allow for effective application without
being exceeded, but low enough not to pose un-
reasonable dietary risks.
For the purposes of both registration and toler-
ance determination, models are used by the EPA
in three ways: to estimate quantities of dietary ex-
posure to pesticide residues; to assess health risks
in relation to dose (using mostly animal models);
and to estimate concentrations of residues that
will end up in groundwater, rivers, and streams
and the consequent implications in terms of hu-
man exposure and risks. This information is com-
bined into a calculation of the estimated excess
lifetime risk of cancer in the affected population.
As per EPA regulatory policy, a tolerance is ap-
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proved if the modeled estimate of risk is less than
one in 1 million, a risk-benefit analysis is per-
formed if the estimate is between one in 1 million
and one in 10,000, and the tolerance is rejected if
the estimate exceeds one in 10,000.
Exposure models used by the EPA must esti-
mate both the quantities of residue that will re-
main on food when it is consumed (after process-
ing and washing) and the quantities of treated
foods that are consumed. The EPA uses a com-
puter-based simulation model that requires data
about the types and amounts of food that people
consume and on the pesticide residue levels [8].
These input data are combined to calculate expo-
sure for specified subpopulations defined by age,
gender, ethnicity, geography, and season. EPA cal-
culates dietary exposure to pesticide residues in
food by using the concept of a Theoretical Maxi-
mum Residue Contribution (TMRC), which re-
flects an upper bound (or worst-case) scenario for
exposure. In calculating the TMRC, EPA esti-
mates average food consumption based on the Na-
tional Food Consumption Survey and assumes
that residues are equal to the tolerance level and
that 100% of the crop in question is treated with
the pesticide. The model estimates the amounts of
raw ingredients used in prepared foods using stan-
dard recipes [9]. Use of the TMRC for exposure
assessment is likely to overstate risk as a result of
washing, processing, and incomplete application
of the pesticide. If a preliminary analysis based on
TMRC shows that the resulting exposure esti-
mates are high enough to be of concern, the model
is rerun with more realistic assumptions called An-
ticipated Residue Concentrations (ARC). In some
cases, the EPA might require the registrant to col-
lect data on residues in food ready for consump-
tion (i.e., market-basket studies).
Some critics complain that conservative esti-
mates of risk may be interpreted as actual risks
[10], and others worry that the special diets of in-
fants and children may not be reflected adequately
by the aggregate models. Despite the important lim-
itations of the EPA exposure model and its required
data inputs, these limitations do not preclude its use
in the determination of regulatory policy.
The second step in risk analysis for pesticides
concerns the relation between exposure and hu-
man risk. Human risk assessment models used by
the EPA accept data from human epidemiology,
animal experiments, in vitro studies, and theoreti-
cal considerations based on molecular structure.
Although epidemiology has played an impor-
tant role in human health-risk assessment [11], it
has clear limitations when it comes to toxicity as-
sessment of environmental contaminants such as
pesticides [12]. Epidemiological studies have poor
sensitivity because they are unable to detect low risks.
They also have poor specificity, because of their in-
ability to distinguish and eliminate other confound-
ing causes of disease. Problems of confounding, pop-
ulation heterogeneity, and long lag times between
exposure and effect all conspire to limit the usefulness
of direct human evidence. For this reason, the EPA
does not consider the absence of epidemiological data
sufficient grounds for denying the registration of a
pesticide (though limitations of epidemiological data
do not preclude their use).
Instead of human data, EPA models rely mostly
on animal experiments to estimate dose-response
relationships. One of the strengths of this type of
data is that they are randomized and therefore of-
fer some protection against confounding. Limita-
tions are that models are required to extrapolate
from very high doses to those that would be ex-
pected to reflect exposure in a real-life situation
such as at the dinner table, and to extrapolate
from rodents to humans [13]. The EPA has devel-
oped a series of risk assessment guidelines for
modeling carcinogenic, reproductive, and develop-
mental risks. Empirical justification for these as-
sumptions is limited, but they are used because
they are regarded as conservative and because it
would be prohibitively costly, if not impossible, to
verify them.
Estimation of the risk associated with the fate
and transport of pesticide residues is problematic.
Although the EPA does sometimes require field-
scale experimental trials, it does so infrequently
because of the high cost, uniqueness, and lack of
generalizability of each experimental setting, and
the variability of weather conditions. Instead, ret-
rospective data collected from monitoring stations
on streams and rivers and in groundwater are used
in computer simulation models to estimate future
ambient concentrations in water [14,15].
Thus, the EPA uses a stepwise approach to re-
quiring data to support its decisions. More data are
required if and only if the model indicates that the
decision would be sensitive to the findings. This is
none other than the value-of-information principle,
which is equally applicable in the context of FDA
policy regarding pharmacoeconomic models.
 
Chlorofluorocarbons.
 
CFCs are very stable chem-
icals that were developed in the 1930s and widely
used as refrigerants, as blowing agents in manufac-
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turing insulating and packaging foam, and as sol-
vents for dry cleaning, microelectronics, and other
uses. CFCs first attracted concern when it was re-
ported that they could reduce the concentration of
stratospheric ozone, which is the primary agent
that screens out excess ultraviolet-B (UV-B) radia-
tion before it reaches the Earth’s surface [16]. In-
creased human exposure to UV-B radiation pro-
motes skin cancer and cataracts and has adverse
effects on various crops and wildlife.
Manufacture and use of CFCs were ultimately
banned on a global scale under the terms of the
1987 Montreal Protocol and subsequent amend-
ments. International agreements and domestic reg-
ulations have been crafted that rely almost entirely
on theoretical predictions derived from mathemat-
ical simulation models. This reliance on models
was widely accepted, at least in part because it
was understood that CFCs would persist in the at-
mosphere for at least a century. If one waited for
definitive empirical evidence of ozone depletion, let
alone evidence of increased incidence of skin cancer
and cataracts, before reducing atmospheric emis-
sions, it might require a century or more to reverse
any harmful effects. These decisions were made in a
context in which the economic costs and health
risks of substitute products were acknowledged.
In the United States, the first regulatory action
was the 1979 ban on the use of CFCs as propel-
lants in aerosol dispensers for hair spray, deodor-
ant, and other personal-care products. These uses
accounted for about half the CFC consumption in
the United States at the time and were regarded as
relatively low-value uses. As research on the ef-
fects of CFCs continued, model-based projections
of the resulting magnitude of ozone depletion os-
cillated, although continuing to support the basic
hypothesis. An early model projected that if CFC
emissions continued at 1974 rates, then strato-
spheric ozone would stabilize at 7% to 13% be-
low the baseline level [16]. A series of four Na-
tional Academy of Science reports, which examined
the current scientific theory, laboratory experiments,
and simulation-model results, reported model-based
estimates of ozone depletion ranging from 2% to
16% [17–20]. The World Meteorological Organi-
zation 1985 summary report showed that uncer-
tainties in simulation-model coefficients resulted
in a range of equilibrium depletion from less than
zero to more than 20%, with even wider ranges as-
sociated with higher, more realistic emission rates
[21].
With this history of varying model projections
as virtually the sole quantitative basis for decision
making, the Vienna Convention was signed in
1985. The Convention provided an international
framework for cooperative study and possible re-
strictions on CFC use. International limits on CFC
consumption were specified by the Montreal Pro-
tocol and signed by most of the large, industrial
nations in September 1987.
The first direct observational evidence of strato-
spheric ozone depletion became available between
the signings of the Vienna Convention and the
Montreal Protocol. In May 1985, the British Ant-
arctic Survey reported that it had observed tempo-
rary but substantial depletion of ozone above its
Antarctic research station each spring beginning in
1981 [22]. There was, however, no specific link to
CFCs, and the possibility that CFCs could induce
such a localized effect had not been previously rec-
ognized. Indeed, for the next several years scien-
tists worked to determine whether the hole was
caused by CFCs or by dynamic mechanisms in-
volving sinking of low-ozone air from higher ele-
vations. The actual cause, suggested in 1986, was
attributed to surface reactions on polar strato-
spheric clouds which inactivate chemicals that
would otherwise remove chlorine and thus pre-
vent ozone depletion [23], and preliminary mea-
surements supporting this hypothesis became
available at the time of signature of the Montreal
Protocol. Definitive evidence supporting the role
of CFCs in creating the hole did not become avail-
able until 1988, after the Protocol was signed. Sta-
tistical analysis of satellite measurements provided
empirical evidence of a downward trend in global
ozone concentrations beginning in March 1988
[24]. Despite the health risks and economic costs
of the alternatives to CFCs, the critical decision to
limit their use was made on the strength of mathe-
matical models rather than direct evidence.
 
National Defense
 
Modeling to guide military decisions is so perva-
sive and established that some of the most thought-
ful, scholarly writing on the role of modeling in
policy making has come from this field [25]. Mod-
els are routinely used for logistical planning, but
more germane to our topic of life-and-death deci-
sions, simulation models are used to guide deci-
sions about the choice of weapon systems and even
to guide combat decisions. Despite the acknowl-
edged limitations of these models, they are used to
guide the planning, deployment, and use of the sec-
ond largest commitment of human resources in the
federal budget after health care.
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Health Policy
 
It is useful to examine how models have been used
to influence resource allocation decisions in health
care. Our purpose is only to show that public-sec-
tor and private-sector health-care decision makers
do pay attention to models. The implication is not
necessarily that the models lead to better deci-
sions—a question that we will return to later—but
that they are perceived as valuable by organiza-
tions entrusted with our health-care dollars. We
give examples of models that have been influential
in public health policy, coverage decisions by pub-
lic and private insurers, and the formulation of
practice guidelines.
The US government has a long history of using
and developing models to guide public health pol-
icy. Models, rather than direct evidence of cost-
effectiveness, have supported vaccine recommen-
dations by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) at least since the late 1960s.
The CDC’s report “An Ounce of Prevention” [26]
reviewed and endorsed a variety of model-based
estimates of gains in quality-adjusted life expect-
ancy and cost-effectiveness ratios. The CDC also
used a model to guide its decision concerning
screening for thyroid disease in persons exposed
to radioactive iodine (I-131) near the Hanford
(WA) nuclear weapons facility. Its recommenda-
tions that pregnant women increase their con-
sumption of folate-rich foods to prevent neural
tube defects were based on a model that synthe-
sized evidence from a variety of sources, rather
than on direct evidence of benefit. As another ex-
ample of government reliance on models, the Na-
tional Institute of Allergic and Infectious Diseases
commissioned the Institute of Medicine twice—
with reports issued in 1985 and again in 1999—to
use models to recommend priorities for the devel-
opment of new vaccines [27,28].
The US Health Care Financing Administration
based its decisions to cover immunization against
pneumococcal pneumonia (1981) and influenza
(1993) under Medicare on influential models [29,
30]. Subsequently, Medicare has appealed to strong
but indirect evidence of cost-effectiveness from mod-
els to cover magnetic resonance angiography in
lieu of carotid angiography prior to carotid ather-
ectomy, and to cover erythropoietin as adjuvant
therapy under the end-stage renal disease program
(personal communication: Sheingold S, US Health
Care Financing Administration). Evidence support-
ing the cost-effectiveness of pharmaceuticals is now
required in support of coverage decisions in Eu-
rope, Canada, and Australia, and guidelines for the
use of models have been promulgated. The Acad-
emy of Managed Care Plans and several individ-
ual managed care companies in the United States
have also issued guidelines for models. Of 70 cost-
effectiveness evaluations submitted to the Austra-
lian Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee
between December 1995 and June 1997, only 17
were based exclusively on direct evidence from
randomized clinical trials, 24 were based only on
models, and 29 used a combination of direct ex-
perimental evidence and modeling (personal com-
munication: Mitchell A, Australian Pharmaceuti-
cal Benefits Advisory Committee). Likewise, several
model-based studies submitted to the Canadian
Coordinating Council of Health Technology As-
sessment (CCOHTA) led to coverage recommen-
dations, including a decision to cover the drug ome-
prazole to treat gastro-esophageal reflux disease
(personal communication: Otten N, formerly with
CCOHTA). In managed care, the role of models—
and of economic evaluations in general—remains
uncertain, but decisions to cover or not to cover
such technologies as enhanced cervical cytology
screening and BRCA gene testing in various
health-maintenance organizations appear to have
been guided in part by models (personal commu-
nication: Eddy D, MD, PhD, consultant).
The role of models in influencing the formula-
tion of influential clinical practice guidelines is
clear. The cervical cancer-screening model devel-
oped by Dr. David Eddy—in the absence of direct
experimental evidence of benefit—was cited in the
American Cancer Society’s revision of its cervical
cancer-screening guidelines. That model suggested
that the incremental value of annual screening af-
ter consecutive negative screens was negligible,
and that less frequent screening, such as every 3
years, was cost-effective [31]. Likewise, an analy-
sis based on the Coronary Heart Disease (CHD)
Policy model [32] was cited by the Second Adult
Treatment Panel of the National Cholesterol
Education Program to support its recommendation
strongly endorsing treatment of mildly elevated low-
density lipoprotein (LDL) levels in persons with a his-
tory of heart disease [33]. This recommendation was
made even before direct evidence from clinical trials
confirmed that drug-mediated lipid lowering reduced
the risk of CHD mortality and nonfatal events by ap-
proximately the degree predicted by the model.
 
Model Validation and Evaluation
 
Many diverse notions of validation or validity
have been applied to policy models. Users and
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critics of policy models believe that some sort of
validation is necessary to protect against incorrect
conclusions and to protect users from being misled
by models. Terms and concepts related to valida-
tion, albeit with somewhat different meanings, in-
clude 
 
verification, face validity
 
, and 
 
corrobora-
tion.
 
 Here, we will use the term 
 
validity
 
 to refer to
the more specific concept of predictive validity,
i.e., whether a model produces outputs that are
consistently and reliably borne out by actual events.
We use the term 
 
verification
 
 to denote a weaker
condition, i.e., that the model’s inputs and outputs
are consistent with actual events, laboratory find-
ings, or generally accepted theories. Included within
the process of verification is what is often called
 
calibration
 
, i.e., ensuring that the model’s outputs
are consistent with known data at the aggregate
level. Also included within the process of verifica-
tion is the process known to modelers as 
 
debug-
ging
 
, or ensuring that the inner workings of the
model are behaving as intended and are free of
coding errors and logical inconsistencies. 
 
Face
validity
 
 concerns whether the outputs of a model
make sense and can be explained intuitively. We use
the term 
 
corroboration
 
 synonymously with 
 
conver-
gent validity
 
, i.e., whether two or more independent
models or studies lead to the same or similar conclu-
sions, or, if they do not, whether the differences can
be explained. Finally, we use the term 
 
evaluation
 
 to
encompass all of the above notions of validity. 
 
Eval-
uation
 
 is our preferred term, because it is the most
general and does not impose any particular view-
point regarding expectations for policy models.
Based on a review of the literature on policy
models and on careful consideration of their pur-
poses, we conclude that establishment of predic-
tive validity is often valuable, but not a prerequi-
site for model use. Some models may be impossible
to validate in this stringent sense. Verification and
calibration are intended to demonstrate that a
model can mimic past behavior, whereas predic-
tive validation refers to assessing whether a model
can predict the future [34]. The EPA Task Force
on Environmental Modeling supported the more
limited criterion for evaluation, saying that “Mod-
els are never literally validated, instead they are in-
validated” [35]. In statistical inference, one never
proves the null hypothesis; one can only disprove
it with reasonable certainty. The same is true of
models. If the predictions of models are consis-
tently contradicted by facts, then the model can
reasonably be rejected—and possibly revised for
future use. Otherwise, use of the model can be
said to be consistent with, or verified by, reality.
 
Model Verification (Calibration)
 
Verification of a model consists of demonstrating
that its inputs and outputs are consistent with
known facts, and that it is functioning properly in
a technical sense. Verification includes tests of
both the internal and external consistency of the
model with known facts.
The process of testing for internal consistency is
called 
 
debugging
 
 by experienced modelers. In de-
bugging, a model is often subjected to various ex-
treme input conditions to test whether it gives the
expected outputs. For example, if a disease-spe-
cific mortality rate is set to zero, then the number
of deaths caused by the associated disease should
be zero. As another example, if the efficacy of a
treatment is zero, then health outcomes should be
identical with or without that treatment. Savvy
modelers know how to debug thoroughly and
convincingly, and this type of verification of ex-
treme cases is much more effective and efficient
than staring at computer code looking for typo-
graphical or logical errors.
Calibration of a model against real data is the
next step in verification, and entails testing for
consistency with observed reality. For example, a
model of a disease that incorporates estimates of
incidence, progression, and survival rates based on
clinical data must then be tested against indepen-
dent estimates of aggregate numbers of cases and
deaths from the disease, such as might be obtained
from national vital statistics or population-based
health services utilization data. An iterative pro-
cess ensues, in which different interpretations of
the input and output data are tested in the model
until consistency is achieved with both. A descrip-
tion of the calibration process should be included
in any report about a model conveyed to decision
makers.
 
Convergent Validity
 
Convergent validity of models concerns the ability
of independently developed models to give similar
results. Convergent validity tests for health-care
models were recommended in the report of the
Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medi-
cine as a response to the problem that the Panel
called 
 
model process uncertainty
 
 [36]. Of course,
convergent validity tests may not be helpful if
models are not truly independent, i.e., if they are
all built on the same flawed assumptions. Thus,
convergent validity tests can be regarded as a source
of increased confidence in models, although they
cannot overcome deficiencies in inputs or logical
assumptions.
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Face Validity
 
Although it is inappropriate to claim that face va-
lidity is sufficient for model use, its absence should
cause decision makers to be skeptical. Relying ex-
clusively on face validity can be hazardous if mea-
surements have not or cannot be made. For exam-
ple, until this century, Newtonian mechanics had
face validity because their predictions were consis-
tent with available measurement techniques. Spe-
cial relativity could be shown empirically to be a
superior model only when technology improved to
the extent that velocities close to the speed of light
could be measured. An example in health care re-
lates to models of the safety of the blood supply,
which once held that the risk of transmission of
the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) increases
in proportion to the prevalence of infection in the
donor population. More sophisticated models that
incorporated seroconversion claimed that the risk
of transmission could actually be higher in lower-
prevalence populations in which the incidence of
infection was growing rapidly [37]. Until data be-
came available to support the newer model, their
face validity was widely questioned, and blood-
screening policies continued to be based on the in-
correct model.
 
Predictive Validity
 
The prevailing view of model validity in public
policy is summarized in an essay by two experi-
enced modelers in the defense arena: “Only mod-
els intended to predict need to be validated. [. . .]
Some models can be validated and used to predict,
and others cannot be validated and may be put
only to nonpredictive uses.” [25] If a model is in-
tended to help decision makers, and not necessar-
ily to predict the future, then it is inappropriate to
demand predictive validity. This is not to say that
prospective validation of models is not valuable,
but the value of the information obtained must be
weighed against the costs of obtaining it.
When can models be truly validated in the pre-
dictive sense? Hodges and Dewar [25] list four
necessary conditions that a situation must satisfy
for predictive validation to be a reasonable goal.
First, the situation must be observable and mea-
surable. Second, the situation must exhibit con-
stancy of structure over time. This condition would
fail to hold, for example, in a premature or static
attempt to validate a model of the clinical perfor-
mance of a diagnostic technology whose users gain
skill over time through experience. Third, the situ-
ation must exhibit constancy across variations of
conditions not specified in the model; this is neces-
sary in order to be able to validate a model under
a wider range of conditions than those for which
data can be obtained. Fourth, the situation must
permit the collection of ample data with which to
make predictive tests of the model. As Hodges and
Dewar observe, “Many models [. . .] cannot be
validated, so it is pointless to try.” [25]
The situations for health-care models would
seem typically to defy these criteria for predictive
validation. Circumstances do change over time, so
that the conditions that held when the model was
designed may not apply in the future. Models de-
veloped for one setting cannot be validated predic-
tively in other settings if the variables that differ-
entiate the settings are not explicit within the
models. Moreover, models designed to predict the
incidence and consequences of unique events, such
as epidemics, cannot be validated predictively be-
cause of insufficient data points. Does the inability
to validate a model predictively render the model
useless? Hodges and Dewar are emphatic in their
response to this question: “Few military models or
models of human decision making can be vali-
dated, and it is counterproductive to demand as a
matter of policy that users and institutional par-
ents attempt to validate them.” They go on to
state: “We reiterate that a model that cannot be
validated in [the predictive] sense is not necessarily
useless; it simply may not be used to make sen-
tences like ‘the model says X.”’[25]
The implications of this view of validation for
the regulation of pharmacoeconomic claims by the
FDA are clear: As long as unvalidated predictive
statements of the type “Drug A will lead to out-
come X” are avoided, models can be useful aids to
decision making if their claims are stated as con-
tingent upon their assumptions and data inputs.
Furthermore, models intended for nonpredictive
uses, including uses as decision aids, can be evalu-
ated successfully using other criteria such as verifi-
cation, corroboration, and face validity.
Models whose outputs are framed as point esti-
mates cannot usually be validated in the predictive
sense because they provide no metric for determin-
ing whether a prediction is close. It may be possi-
ble to establish external standards to determine
whether a prediction is close enough for the deci-
sion-making purpose intended, but these may be
viewed with suspicion unless the standards are set
in advance of the validation exercise. Models whose
outputs are framed probabilistically offer greater
opportunity for prospective validation. For exam-
ple, weather forecasting models can be, and are, val-
idated when their predictions are framed in proba-
 Modeling For Public Policy Decisions
 
357
 
bilistic terms (e.g., the probability of rain is 40%).
By studying the frequency of rain on days for
which the model claims a 40% probability, the
possibility exists to compare the actual and pre-
dicted frequencies of rain. By analogy, health-care
models that produce estimates of uncertainty
around model predictions—as from Monte Carlo
simulations and stochastic sensitivity analyses—
can be validated predictively provided that the
outputs of the model are measurable. Even if the
outputs of a health-care model are not measur-
able, inputs may be subject to validation if the
modelers provide uncertainty bands around them.
For example, a model of a cholesterol-lowering in-
tervention in the prevention of heart disease could
be said to be validated if empirical evidence of
the quantitative association between cholesterol
changes and heart disease events fall within the
range of parameter estimates provided with the
model. The National Research Council’s report on
microsimulation modeling espoused this view of
validation as a process for measuring the uncer-
tainty or variability in a model’s estimates and
identifying the sources of that uncertainty [4].
Tests for predictive validity effectively expand
upon tests for verification by expanding the set of
observations against which model results can be
verified. The decision to embark on, or require in
a regulatory sense, additional data against which
to validate a model ought to be guided by the
value-of-information principle; the value of reduc-
ing uncertainty in the model in terms of the ex-
pected outcomes of improved decisions must out-
weigh the cost of obtaining, and waiting for, the
information.
 
Approaches to Model Acceptability and Accreditation
 
Recognizing that true validation of models is gen-
erally impossible and, as some authors have
noted, useless to attempt, alternative criteria based
on whether the model is acceptable to its users, or
accredited by independent adjudicators, may be
invoked. Such criteria for model evaluation have
been espoused in the environmental and defense
areas, and they have direct applicability to health-
care models. The Pharmaceutical Benefits Advi-
sory Committee in Australia requires a stringent
accreditation process for all models submitted as
evidence of cost-effectiveness, including a peer re-
view that often catches technical errors [38].
Because it relies on models to support regula-
tory decision making, the EPA has devoted consid-
erable resources toward developing criteria for the
acceptability of models. In response to the grow-
 
ing need to establish general criteria for model
evaluation, an Agency Task Force on Environmen-
tal Regulatory Modeling (ATFERM) was established
in 1992 and reported its findings in 1994 [35].
The ATFERM identified four criteria for evalu-
ation of models: appropriateness, accessibility, us-
ability, and reliability. Appropriateness refers to
whether the model is appropriate for the physical
system being described. This criterion asks whether
the logical assumptions and relationships among
variables are consistent with theoretical and empir-
ical evidence about the physical system, be it trans-
port of toxins through air or water, or human bio-
logic response. Accessibility examines whether the
model is available for public review. This criterion
was echoed by the Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in
Health and Medicine in its recommendations
regarding reporting of cost-effectiveness analyses
[36]. Models should be open to peer review, possi-
bly under controlled and confidential conditions
that protect proprietary interests in the code. Us-
ability is concerned with functional and opera-
tional aspects such as the cost and feasibility of
running the model in a timely fashion.
It is apparent that actual application of these
criteria requires a certain amount of subjectivity
and interpretation, but the EPA has determined that
it is within its purview to make those judgments
and thereby permit the use of models that it judges
acceptable. Moreover, the EPA’s judgment on ac-
ceptability is based in large part on the model’s ac-
ceptability to its peer reviewers and users.
The defense modelers, Hodges and Dewar, pro-
pose criteria for evaluating models used for mar-
keting defense-related products, and these criteria
have clear analogies to the regulation of models
designed to sell pharmaceutical products. They
caution that models, especially the simple models
often used for marketing purposes, could be inap-
propriately used to make predictions and that the
modeler is responsible for disclaiming any inten-
tion to do so. The forecasts should be framed as
contingent upon assumptions and not as uncondi-
tional predictions. They conclude that “the analyst-
cum-salesman is not off the hook: he must have a
good idea about how to produce the benefits and
must accompany presentations with appropriate
caveats.” [25]
Hodges and Dewar also comment on what they
call 
 
a fortiori
 
 arguments, or what is often referred
to in health-care modeling as worst-case assump-
tions, or bending over backwards. In other words,
the modeler makes extreme assumptions unfavor-
able to the conclusion and is still able to reach the
 358
 
Weinstein et al.
 
conclusion. The phrase “even if” is pervasive in
reporting results from this sort of sensitivity analy-
sis. The authors raise the question whether the as-
sertion that the assumptions really are extreme
and bound reality may itself require validation.
However, in the balance, they conclude that “it is
consistent with typical usage to classify [this use of
the model in 
 
a fortiori
 
 arguments] as a nonpredic-
tive use and to loosen up on evaluation of [the
part of the argument that claims that the assump-
tions are extreme].” [25]
Students of modeling are taught that, if nothing
else, models can be useful to help structure thinking
and to generate hypotheses and options [39,40].
Even these models require evaluation to avoid the
trap of using ex post logic to rationalize the coun-
terintuitive conclusions of data-free models.
 
Validation of Health Care Decision Models
 
If one accepts the conditions stated by Hodges and
Dewar, then many health-care models would not
be susceptible to true predictive validation. Gener-
ally, situations being modeled are changing in
ways not explicitly included in the model. Tech-
nologies being modeled, and those to which they
are being compared, may change between the time
the model is developed and the time data become
available. Population characteristics may change
as a result of environmental changes or changes in
a disease entity. A striking example of the latter
was the onset of resistant strains of HIV after initi-
ation of use of antiretroviral therapies such as zi-
dovudine [41], thereby invalidating the previous
model [42].
Although it should not be a prerequisite for
model use, predictive validation can be valuable. It
can help modelers revise models for future use, in
effect extending the range of data against which to
calibrate them. It can also help users of models
guard against basing future decisions on models
that have been found to be inconsistent with known
data, although it need not deter them from using
revised versions of such models that have been
verified.
 
Implications for Implementation of FDAMA
 
The fundamental policy question facing the FDA
under FDAMA is under what conditions to permit
drug manufacturers to use models as the basis for
claims of cost-effectiveness. As long as modeling
results are stated as conditional upon input as-
sumptions, tests of verification, such as debugging
and calibration, could be regarded as sufficient.
Transparency is essential in describing the input
values, the logical assumptions, and the process of
verification. In keeping this perspective, the input
data themselves need not be validated so long as
they are not stated as claims and so long as the re-
sults of the model are stated conditionally upon
the inputs.
Realistically, this standard of stating claims as
conditional upon assumptions may be difficult to
enforce. Therefore, a policy that recognizes the
value of, and need for, prospective data collection
under certain circumstances is needed in order to
guard against relying on unsubstantiated assump-
tions. Section 114 of FDAMA defines a criterion
of competent and reliable scientific information as
a basis for economic claims. According to the US
Senate and House Reports on FDAMA, the intent
of Congress was to apply the definition of 
 
compe-
tent and reliable scientific information
 
 that had
been previously articulated and implemented by
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in regulat-
ing advertising claims [43]. The key to the FTC
standard, in turn, rests on its definition of 
 
prior
substantiation
 
, namely, the degree of evidence in
support of the claim. The FTC does not require
absolute proof in support of a claim. Rather, it ap-
plies a cost-benefit test to the process of collecting
information in support of the claim. According to
the FTC regulation, what defines 
 
reasonable
 
 
 
sub-
stantiation
 
 depends “on a number of factors rele-
vant to the benefits and costs of substantiating a
particular claim.” [43] The regulation lists among
these factors: “the consequences of a false claim,
the benefits of a truthful claim, and the cost of de-
veloping substantiation for the claim.” [43]
As this article is being written, there remains
some dispute as to whether the competent and re-
liable standard in Section 114 of FDAMA applies
both to the effectiveness and to the cost estimates
in a cost-effectiveness model. Logically, the same
criteria for weighing the value and cost of addi-
tional information to support decisions affecting
the cost-effective use of drugs ought to be applied
to all information that is relevant to the decision
maker. However, the FDA currently interprets the
statute to restrict the dissemination of models that
incorporate estimates of clinical effects outside the
approved indications. This interpretation could
have the effect of impeding the flow of informa-
tion to decision makers, even if the conclusions
from the models are clearly stated as contingent
upon the assumed extrapolations beyond proxi-
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mal end points in clinical trials or to other target
populations.
The decision-theoretic concept of VOI can be
used to address the cost-benefit test implied by the
“competent and reliable” standard [2]. VOI mea-
sures the difference between the expected conse-
quences of making a decision with additional
information and the expected consequences of
having to make that decision without the informa-
tion. Embedded within VOI are the relative conse-
quences of errors of omission and commission.
To enable an assessment of the value of infor-
mation that might solidify the assumptions and in-
put estimates in models, probabilistic representa-
tion of model inputs and outputs is required. This
is a deficiency of most current models, under-
standably so because the computational challenges
of fully probabilistic modeling are only beginning
to be met by technology. But as the new century
begins, prospects for practical approaches to proba-
bilistic modeling are emerging that promise to make
VOI analysis a practical tool for regulating the flow
of information. The implications extend beyond the
regulatory functions of the FDA and into the re-
source allocation decisions of the National Insti-
tutes of Health and of private and corporate inves-
tors in health research and development.
 
Conclusions
 
Mathematical models are used routinely and with
formal governmental authorization in environ-
mental and defense-related decision making. Al-
though empirical validation of the predictions of
these models is often prohibitively expensive or
even impossible, their conclusions are dissemi-
nated widely and form the basis for decisions
that involve substantial resource commitments
and health consequences. For the most part, envi-
ronmental and military models do not claim pre-
dictive validity; rather, they are intended to syn-
thesize current knowledge in a form that can guide
decisions. Decision makers in these domains ac-
knowledge the limitations of models but rely on
them nevertheless.
It is unclear why models are more widely ac-
cepted in other domains of public policy than in
clinical medicine. The life-and-death implications
of an ill-advised decision to register a pesticide can
be at least as dire as the consequences of substitut-
ing one safe and effective drug for another. An ob-
vious hypothesis is that modeling is necessary in
environmental health because human experiments
are physically and ethically impossible, and hence
it is accepted as a necessary evil. However, that
does not explain why EPA rules about substantiat-
ing models with data on exposures or toxicities
for new pesticides are more relaxed than FDA
rules on pharmacoeconomic claims for new drugs.
Perhaps the reason is that models are relatively
new in medicine and more established in environ-
mental science. In any case, we believe there are
lessons to be learned from all of these areas of
model-guided decision making.
Many, if not most, pharmacoeconomic models
are also intended to aid decision making rather
than predict the consequences of interventions.
Models that do not claim predictive validity should
not be subjected to the same tests as models that
make predictive claims. Modeling results that
are stated as conditional upon input assumptions
could be considered admissible so long as the
logic, code, and integrity of the description of the
assumptions and data of the model itself have
been verified. Following this perspective, the in-
puts that enter the model, and the outputs that it
produces, need not be validated prospectively so
long as they are not stated as claims, and so long
as the results of the model are stated conditionally
upon the inputs. However, in many circumstances
validation of model predictions against prospec-
tive data may be valuable in revising the model for
future use. The value of such validation must be
weighed against the cost.
Decision models that are used for communica-
tion with decision makers must be evaluated as to
whether the contingent claims they make are cor-
rect. Evaluation criteria should therefore address
the following:
• Transparency: Are the assumptions and input
parameters, and the logic connecting them to
outputs, stated with complete clarity and are
they open to peer review?
• Verification: Are the outputs of the model con-
sistent with observed data? Has the model been
debugged and tested for internal consistency?
• Corroboration: Have other models of the same
problem produced similar results contingent
upon similar assumptions and input parameters?
• Face validity: Do the results of the model make
sense in relation to theoretical considerations,
and can they be explained in intuitive terms?
• Accreditation: Has the model been subjected
to peer review by a dispassionate reviewer and
found to be what it claims to be?
Tests of corroboration and face validity may
not always be possible or even desirable, espe-
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cially for models whose results contradict the con-
ventional wisdom. These might be regarded as
generally desirable, but not necessary, aspects of
model evaluation.
Tests of predictive validity of models may or
may not be worth the cost, depending on the cir-
cumstances. This statement applies to the question
of whether direct evidence from clinical trials is re-
quired to validate the assumptions or results from
models. Decisions and regulations about what em-
pirical and experimental evidence to collect should
be guided by the application of VOI analysis to
models. It would be preferable to apply the con-
cept of VOI, even if a formal analysis is impracti-
cal, than to apply a rigid criterion that prospective
data are or are not always required to validate mod-
els predictively. In the context of economic models
for pharmaceuticals, the test adopted in Section 114
of FDAMA requires that the value of additional data
outweigh the costs and consequences of obtaining
them. This implies that models for which the cost of
obtaining additional information, including forgone
benefits from withholding potentially beneficial or
cost-effective interventions, is not outweighed by the
value of the information, should be considered ap-
propriate for decision making in their present form.
When the cost of obtaining the information is jus-
tified by the value of information, the model can still
be useful for interim decision making, but uncondi-
tional claims based on the model should be avoided.
Models are useful guides to decision making, even
though they can always be improved with additional
time and resources. Whether the time and resources to
obtain further validation are justified depends on the
value and cost of obtaining the data. It is inappropri-
ate to expect—or demand—that models predict the
future accurately, because they can only incorporate
what is known at the time the model is brought to
bear on a decision. We conclude with a summary
comment by the eminent statistical scientist, George
Box [5]: “All models are wrong, but some are useful.”
 
This project was supported by a research grant from the
International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufactur-
ers’ Associations. An earlier version of this paper was pre-
sented by Peter J. Neumann, ScD, at the Fourth Annual
Meeting of the International Society for Pharmacoeconomics
and Outcomes Research, Crystal City, VA, May 26, 1999.
 
References
 
1 Raiffa H. Decision Analysis: Introductory Lectures
on Choices under Uncertainty. Reading, MA: Add-
ison Wesley, 1968.
2 Claxton K, Neumann PJ, Araki S, Weinstein MC.
 
Bayesian value of information analysis: an applica-
tion to a policy model of Alzheimer’s disease. Int J
Technol Assess Health Care 2001; 17:38–55.
3 Konikow LF, Bredehoeft JD. Ground-water mod-
els cannot be validated. Adv Water Resources
1992;15:75–83.
4 National Research Council. Improving Informa-
tion for Social Policy Decisions: the Uses of Micro-
simulation Modeling. Vol 1. Review and Recom-
mendations. Washington, DC: National Academy
Press, 1991.
5 Box GEP, Hunter WG, Hunter JS. Statistics for
Experimenters: an Introduction to Design, Data
Analysis, and Model Building. New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1978.
6 Johannesson M, Jönsson B, Kjekshus J, et al. Cost
effectiveness of simvastatin treatment to lower
cholesterol levels in patients with coronary heart
disease. N Engl J Med 1997;336:332–6.
7 US Environmental Protection Agency. Require-
ments for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of
Implementation Plans: Final Rule. 61 Federal Reg-
ister 41838. August 12, 1996.
8 US Environmental Protection Agency. Office of
Pesticide Programs. Policy for the Use of Anticipated
Residues of Pesticides in Foods for Use in Chronic
Dietary Exposure Assessments. Presented to the EPA
Science Advisory Panel June 1997 (Draft).
9 Winter CK. Dietary pesticide risk assessment. Rev
Environ Contam Toxicol 1992;127:23–67.
10 McCarthy JF. Average residues vs. tolerances: an
overview of industry studies. In: Tweedy BG,
Dishburger HJ, Ballantine LG, McCarthy J, Mur-
phy J, eds. Pesticide Residues and Food Safety: a
Harvest of Viewpoints. Washington, DC: Ameri-
can Chemical Society, 1991.
11 National Research Council. Environmental Epide-
miology. Washington, DC: National Academy Press,
1991.
12 Cohrssen JJ, Covello VT. Risk Analysis: A Guide
to Principles and Methods for Analyzing Health
and Environmental Risks. Washington, DC: US
Council on Environmental Quality, Executive Of-
fice of the President, 1989.
13 National Research Council. Science and Judgment
in Risk Assessment. Washington, DC: National
Academy Press, 1994.
14 Zubkoff PL. The use of runoff and surface water
transport and fate models in the pesticide regula-
tion process. Weed Technol 1992;6:743–8.
15 Jones RL. Use of modeling in developing label re-
strictions for agricultural chemicals. Weed Tech-
nol 1992;6:683–7.
16 Molina MJ, Rowland RF. Stratospheric ozone sink
for chlorofluoromethanes: chlorine atom catalyzed
destruction of ozone. Nature 1974;249:810–1.
17 National Academy of Sciences. Halocarbons: Ef-
fects on Stratospheric Ozone. Washington, DC:
National Academy Press, 1976.
 Modeling For Public Policy Decisions
 
361
 
18 National Academy of Sciences. Protection Against
Depletion of Stratospheric Ozone by Chlorofluo-
rocarbons. Washington, DC: National Academy
Press, 1979.
19 National Academy of Sciences. Causes and Effects
of Stratospheric Ozone Depletion: an Update.
Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1982.
20 National Academy of Sciences. Causes and Effects
of Stratospheric Ozone Depletion: Update 1983.
Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1984.
21 World Meteorological Organization. Atmospheric
Ozone 1985. Geneva: Global Ozone Research and
Monitoring Project, Publication #16, 1985.
22 Farman JC, Gardiner BG, Shanklin JD. Large
losses of total ozone in Antarctica reveal seasonal
ClOx/NOx interaction. Nature 1985;315:207–10.
23 Solomon S, Garcia RR, Rowland FS, et al. On the
depletion of Antarctic ozone. Nature 1986;321:
755–8.
24 National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Executive Summary, Ozone Trends Panel. Wash-
ington, DC: NASA, March 15, 1988.
25 Hodges JS, Dewar JA. Is It You or Your Model
Talking? A Framework for Model Validation.
Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, R-4114-
AF/A/OSD, 1992.
26 Centers for Disease Control. An ounce of preven-
tion. Am J Prev Med 1999;16:248–63.
27 Institute of Medicine National Academy of Sci-
ences. New Vaccines Development: Establishing
Priorities, Vol. 1. Diseases of Importance in the
United States. Washington, DC: National Acad-
emy Press, 1985.
28 Institute of Medicine National Academy of Sci-
ences. Vaccines for the 21st Century: a Tool for
Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: National Acad-
emy Press, 1999.
29 Willems JS, Sanders CR, Riddiough MA, Bell JC.
Cost-effectiveness of vaccination against pneumo-
coccal pneumonia. N Engl J Med 1980;303:553–9.
30 Riddiough MA, Sisk JE, Bell JC. Influenza vacci-
nation: cost-effectiveness and public policy. JAMA
1983;249:3189–95.
31 Eddy DM. Screening for cervical cancer. Ann In-
tern Med 1990;113:214–26.
32 Goldman L, Weinstein MC, Goldman PA, et al.
Cost-effectiveness of HMG-CoA reductase inhibi-
tion for primary and secondary prevention of cor-
onary heart disease. JAMA 1991;265:1145–51.
33 Expert Panel on Detection, Evaluation, Treatment
of High Blood Cholesterol in Adults. Summary of
the second report of the National Cholesterol Edu-
cation Program (NCEP) Expert Panel on Detec-
tion, Evaluation, and Treatment of High Blood
Cholesterol in Adults (Adult Treatment Panel II).
JAMA 1993;269:3015–23.
34 Anderson MP, Woessner WW. The role of the
post-audit in model validation. Adv Water Re-
sources 1992;15:167–73.
35 US Environmental Protection Agency. Report of
the Task Force on Environmental Regulatory
Modeling: Guidance, Support Needs, Draft Crite-
ria, and Charter. EPA 500-R-94–001 Office of
Solid Waste and Emergency Response. Washing-
ton, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994.
36 Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine. Gold
MR, Siegel JE, Russell LB, et al, eds. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1996.
37 Litvak E, Siegel JE, Pauker SG, et al. Whose blood
is safer? The effect of the stage of the epidemic on
screening for HIV. Med Decis Making 1997;17:
455–63.
38 Mitchell A. Update and evaluation of Australian
guidelines. Med Care 1996;34 (Suppl.):DS216–25.
39 Keeney RL. Value-Focused Thinking. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1992.
40 US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment.
The Implications of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of
Medical Technology. Washington, DC: US Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 1980.
41 Concorde Coordinating Committee. Concorde.
MRC/ANRS randomised double-blind controlled
 
trial of immediate and deferred zidovudine in symp-
tom-free HIV infection. Lancet 1994;343:871–81.
42 Schulman KA, Lynn LA, Glick HA, Eisenberg JM.
Cost effectiveness of low-dose zidovudine therapy
for asymptomatic patients with human immuno-
deficiency virus (HIV) infection. Ann Intern Med
1991;114:798–802.
43 US Federal Trade Commission. Policy Statement
Regarding Advertising Substantiation Program. 49
Federal Register 30999, August 2, 1984.
